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I. INTRODUCTION-SCOPE OF ARTICLE
LTHOUGH this article includes developments in the bank-
ruptcy courts, the author has attempted to limit the reported
cases to those involving state law' or other developments that
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1. See, e.g., homesteads, exemptions, automatic stay, etc.
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directly impact enforcement of the debtor-creditor relationship.2 This is
not intended to be an exhaustive survey of bankruptcy developments, but
rather an update regarding cases of interest to the Texas based debtor-
creditor practitioner. 3
This Survey period, Texas based bankruptcy courts returned to further
developments in the area of Texas homesteads, both urban and rural. A
series of opinions, including one from the Fifth Circuit, provides a good
deal of guidance into the nature and extent of the homestead exemption
available to Texas debtors. Those cases are the focus of this year's Survey.
II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
A. BANKRUPTCY REFORM
During the 2001 legislative session, so-called bankruptcy reform legisla-
tion remained an issue. Despite versions having passed both the House
and the Senate early in the session, no conference committee met during
calendar year 2001. Although it is pure speculation at this point, it re-
mains possible that substantial revisions to the Bankruptcy Code may
have been passed by the time this Survey is published; however, one
would hope that the "reform" ultimately passed will be in a more worka-
ble version than last year's bill.
B. ARTICLE 9
Effective July 1, 2001, Texas joined most other states by implementing
the revised Article 9 of the UCC, known in Texas as the Texas Business &
Commerce Code.4 Although Article 9 is beyond the scope of this article,
the creditors' rights practitioner should become familiar with its more sig-
nificant changes to existing law, especially in the areas of perfection, 5
which could have an impact on a subsequent debt collection effort or
2. See, e.g., dischargeability, automatic stay, etc.
3. Judge Leif M. Clark provides an extensive and thorough analysis of bankruptcy
developments in the Fifth Circuit in the Fifth Circuit Symposium published annually by the
Texas Tech Law Review. See Judge Leif M. Clark, Bankruptcy, Fifth Circuit Symposium, 32
TEX. TECH L. REV. 667 (2001); 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 405 (2000); 30 TEX. TECH L. REV.
441 (1999); 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 355 (1998); 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 299 (1997); Dean G.
Pawlowic, Banking Law, Fifth Circuit Symposium, 31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 385 (2000); 30
TEX. TECH L. REV. 425 (1999). For other, broader surveys that focus exclusively on bank-
ruptcy law developments, see J. Westbrook & E. Warren, Recent Developments, Univer-
sity of Texas School of Law Bankruptcy Conference (2001); G. Pronske, Recent
Developments, State Bar of Texas Advanced Business Bankruptcy Course (2001).
4. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.101-.709 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
5. For example, the location for filing a financing statement is now based upon the
location of the debtor, rather than the location of the collateral. See, e.g., id. § 9.307 (loca-
tion of debtor). Other changes have been made to allow for "authentication" rather than
original signatures. See id. § 9.102(7) (definition of "authenticate").
Some commentators have already provided some introductory analysis to the new filing
rules. See Terry M. Anderson et al., Attachment and Perfection of Security Interests Under
Revised Article 9: A Nuts and Bolts Primer, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 179 (2001); see
also Donald W. Garland, Uniform Commercial Code Revised Article 9: Understanding the
Changes to Secured Transactions, 64 TEX. BAR J. 974 (2001).
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bankruptcy filing. Perhaps the best compilation of articles devoted to the
effect of the revised Article 9 on bankruptcy practice is found in a recent
symposium issue of the American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review.
6
III. BANKRUPTCY CASES
A. HOMESTEADS AND EXEMPTIONS
A number of cases during the Survey period addressed the nature and
extent of the Texas homestead. These cases arose in varying factual con-
texts; however, the common theme emanating from these cases is that, no
matter the creativity of the homestead claimant, each family is only enti-
tled to one homestead.
1. Proceeds of Sale of Homestead
In In re Zibman7 the debtors sold their home, placed the proceeds of
the sale in an unsegregated bank account, and moved to Massachusetts.
A few days later, the debtors filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection,
and they claimed as exempt the full amount of the proceeds from the sale
of their Houston home. On that same day, however, the debtors moved
into a town home in Massachusetts under a six month lease, and they
testified that they had no intention of reinvesting the proceeds in another
Texas homestead within six months.8
The homestead claim was made under Section 41.001(c) of the Texas
Property Code, which provides that the proceeds from the sale of a
homestead are not subject to seizure for a creditor's claim for six months
following the date of the sale.9 The theory behind the debtor's exemption
claim was, presumably, that courts typically take a "snapshot" view of a
debtor's financial condition as reflected on schedules filed effective as of
the date of the bankruptcy case. As of the petition date, the debtor still
had the proceeds in hand; therefore, that would be the end of the inquiry.
The Fifth Circuit, however, found that the debtors were not entitled to
claim the proceeds exemption. 10 While it is true that a "snapshot is
6. See, e.g., G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bank-
ruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 3 (2001); Steven L. Harris and Charles W. Mooney,
Jr., Revised Article 9 Meets the Bankruptcy Code: Policy and Impact, id. at 85; C. Scott
Pryor, How Revised Article 9 Will Turn the Trustee's Strong-Arm into a Weak Finger: A
Potpourri of Cases, id. at 229. For an introduction to the changes in filing and perfection
rules, see Anderson, supra note 5, at 179.
7. 268 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2001).
8. Id. at 300-01.
9. Section 41.001 provides as follows:
Interest in land exempt from seizure
a. A homestead.. .[is] exempt from seizure for the claims of creditors except
for encumbrances properly fixed on homestead property.
b. * * *
c. The homestead claimant's proceeds of a sale of a homestead are not sub-
ject to seizure for a creditor's claim for six months after the date of sale.
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (Vernon 2000).
10. Zibman, 268 F.3d at 304.
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taken," that snapshot can only consist of the rights that the debtor ulti-
mately had as of that date. As the court says, "the important reminder is
that it is the entire state law applicable on the filing date that is determi-
native."'"I The Fifth Circuit held that the lower courts, which allowed the
exemption, did not apply the entire Texas law that was applicable. The
Fifth Circuit added that the lower courts effectively read the six month
limitation out of the statute, and "transformed an explicitly limited ex-
emption into a permanent one.' 12
Presumably, the Fifth Circuit felt that it was implicit in the six month
statute that those proceeds would actually be invested within that six
month period. Moreover, the court noted that the object of the proceeds
exemption was to protect the concept of a homestead, and "not to protect
the proceeds, in and of themselves."' 13
As noted above, the debtors made no effort to reinvest the proceeds in
another homestead. To the contrary, they moved from Texas and entered
into a long term lease in another state. Therefore, but for the intervention
of the bankruptcy, the proceeds would have lost their exempt character
under state law. That being the "entire" law applicable to the proceeds,
the Fifth Circuit reasoned, the debtors were not entitled to the exemption
claim.
2. One Homestead-Even While Separated
In re Dawson14 involved not only multiple tracts of land, but important
lessons regarding the timing of a bankruptcy filing and homestead claim
during the pendency of a divorce. In Dawson, the debtor and his soon to
be ex-wife lived in a home that was the wife's separate property prior to
marriage. The parties separated and the debtor moved into a small apart-
ment complex, which he owned as his separate property. 15
The wife filed for divorce in January 2000, a final decree was signed on
April 13, 2001, which became final on May 14, 2001. The decree awarded
the single family residence to the wife and ordered the apartment com-
plex to be sold with the proceeds divided evenly between the debtor and
the ex-wife.
During the pendency of the divorce, the debtor filed a petition under
Chapter 13. Again, at the time the bankruptcy was filed, the parties were
still married, but they were living apart. The wife objected to the home-
stead claim, asserting that the single family residence was the only home-
stead, which precluded the debtor from claiming another property as an
urban homestead during the pendency of the divorce.
The court's analysis began with the fundamental principle that "Texas
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 305 (quoting In re England, 975 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (5th Cir. 1992)).
14. 266 B.R. 355 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001).
15. Apparently, this apartment complex was claimed by the debtor as his homestead
prior to the marriage. Id. at 357.
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law allows one homestead for a family."16 Additionally, the homestead
may be the separate property of one of the spouses or their community
property, "but the wife cannot have one homestead and the husband
another., 17
Assuming the family was entitled to only one homestead, then, in order
for the husband to claim the other property as homestead, there would
have had to have been an abandonment. The court found, however, that
the debtor could not unilaterally abandon or change the homestead by
himself. 18 Accordingly, the court found that the debtor could not claim a
separate homestead from that already established by the family until a
final decree of divorce was entered and the familial relationship actually
terminated.19
3. Rural Homestead-Non- Contiguous Tracts
Turning to rural homesteads, 20 it is important to note that the limita-
tion to one homestead does not necessarily mean that all of the tracts of a
rural homestead need be contiguous. In In re Murray,21 the debtor owned
three tracts of land, two of which were contiguous and the other de-
tached. A 33 acre tract and a 15 acre tract were contiguous to each other,
but a third tract of 147 acres was about a half mile from the other proper-
ties.22 As of the filing of the case, the debtor lived in a mobile home on
the 33 acre tract, and he was continuing to grow hay on those tracts in
order to supplement his income and barter for other goods. He also cut
wood from all three properties, in particular, the non-contiguous tract.
The debtor and his wife also used all three tracts for various activities
including gardening, fishing, and "recreational and aesthetic activities
16. Id. at 358 (citing In re Claflin, 761 F.2d 1088, 1092 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that a
wife cannot have one homestead and the husband another)). The Texas Government Code
also provides some statutory definitions of "family." See TEX. Gov. CODE ANN.
§§ 573.022, 573.024 (Vernon 2001); see also Texas Family Code § 71.003 (Vernon Supp.
2002).
17. In re Dawson, 266 B.R. at 358 (citing In re Cumpton, 30 B.R. 49, 51 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1983)).
18. In re Dawson, 266 B.R. at 358.
19. Id. at 359. A practice note: the opinion is silent on this issue; however, one won-
ders whether it would have been beneficial for the debtor simply to dismiss and refile after
the divorce became final. In that event, the debtor should have been entitled to his own
homestead.
20. The Texas Property Code provides for a 10 acre urban homestead and up to a 200
acre rural homestead. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §41.002 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
21. 260 B.R. 815 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001).
22. The rural homestead "for a family" may consist of up to 200 acres, while a home-
stead for a single, adult person may not exceed 100 acres:
(b) if used for the purposes of a rural home, the homestead shall consist of:
(1) for a family, not more than 200 acres, which may be in one or more
parcels, with the improvements thereon; or
(2) for a single adult person, not otherwise entitled to a homestead, not
more than 100 acres, which may be in one or more parcels, with the im-
provements thereon.
TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(b).
2002]
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such as bird watching and picnicking. '23
In short the court required the debtor to establish four things: (1) the
tracts are rural in nature; (2) the debtor qualifies as the head of a family
(because he claims more than 100 acres); (3) the debtor demonstrates
"overt acts of homestead usage consistent with a rural home;" and (4) the
debtor has the intent to claim the three tracts as homestead.24
The 100 acre issue was complicated by the fact that the debtor and his
spouse had executed a premarital agreement under which the debtor's
wife specifically waived her homestead rights, as well as limited the
debtor's obligation to provide financial support to her. The court noted
that the family relation under Texas law is one of status and not merely of
contract, and "any desire to keep assets separate does not necessarily de-
feat the existence of a family or prohibit the head of that family from
claiming a homestead. '25 Moreover, as noted in the earlier case, a family
may claim only one homestead. With these concepts in mind, the court
found that the debtors had chosen the three tracts to claim as their
homestead.
Interestingly, the court noted, with apparent approval (and no nod to
modern society), that Texas case law has long held that "the husband is
the head of the household," and that his declaration of a homestead
would bind the wife and the rest of the family. Thus, the court apparently
concluded that the male debtor's declaration would control over any con-
trary decision of his wife.26 This was buttressed by the fact that the spouse
lived on the same tracts as Murray, "uses utilities paid for by Murray,
burns the wood chopped by Murray, and likely eats the food bought by
Murray. '"27
Having found that Murray was the head of the household, the court
then had to determine whether the three tracts were used for purposes of
a rural home. The court did not require a strict economic or profit/loss
test, but applied a broader approach, looking for use consistent with that
of a rural home.28
That rather permissive approach, however, was not the end of the in-
quiry. The court still had to determine whether the non-contiguous tract
was part of this rural homestead. The apparent issue was whether the
detached tract contributed to the "comfort, enjoyment, or convenience of
the residents or the family."'2 9 Although the opinion indicates that the
court was not entirely comfortable with the even more liberal view found
in some cases, the court nevertheless held that because the debtor had
23. Murray, 260 B.R. at 820.
24. Id. at 823.
25. Id. at 825.
26. Id. at 825 n.36.
27. Id. at 827.
28. An earlier opinion cited in Murray held that the "'use of the land for shelter and
protection, comfort, convenience, and enjoyment of the home' could constitute support for
purposes of the rural homestead." Murray, 260 B.R. at 829 (quoting In re Mitchell, 132
B.R. 553 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1991)).
29. Id. at 830.
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farmed and cut wood from the separate tract and also irrigated the land
and "built a duck blind" for that area, such use indicated that the land
belonged as part of his homestead. Accordingly, all three tracts were
found to constitute Murray's rural homestead. 3
0
4. Rural Homestead-Separate Tracts But Not Rented Property
In re Webb 3' provides a useful contrast to the analysis and holding in
Murray. In Webb, Chapter 13 debtors claimed a rural homestead, in
which they attempted to include three additional tracts of land on which
three rental houses were located. The court touched upon the same re-
quirements that were analyzed more in depth in Murray, that is, that the
non-contiguous tracts must be used for purposes of the rural home.32 In
Webb, the debtors used the other tracts for no reason other than the gen-
eration of income as rental property. Although the generation of rental
income is arguably for the support of the family, the court found that the
mere use of rental proceeds as income did not constitute "support" for
purposes of a home. 33
5. Rural Homestead-No Rural "Business" Homestead
Another limitation on the rural homestead (and a distinction from its
urban counterpart) is that property utilized in the operation of a business
is not suitable for a rural homestead claim. In In re Perry,34 Judge Leif
Clark provides a detailed analysis of how a court distinguishes between
an urban and rural homestead.
In Perry, the debtor owned a 26 acre tract adjacent to a 59 acre tract.
Upon filing bankruptcy, the debtor claimed both tracts as one rural
homestead. The court was faced with two issues: whether the debtors
could claim the original 26 acre tract as homestead notwithstanding a
30. Id. at 831. The opinion did not address this, but it appeared that one of the
properties was contiguous to the debtor's home tract. Perhaps if the debtor used that adja-
cent house as storage, a work area, or for other uses connected to the house, that tract
could have been saved.
31. 263 B.R. 788 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001).
32. See id. at 791-92. The Webb court framed the issue in the more simplistic but
equally useful question of whether the non-contiguous tracts were used "for the purposes
of a home." Id. (citing Kocke v. Conquest, 35 S.W.2d 673, 678 (Tex. 1931)).
33. Id. at 795-96. The court recognized that over the historical development of the
rural homestead exemption, the generation of some rental income, such as by way of a
share-cropping arrangement with a tenant might not defeat the rural homestead claim. The
court cited Youngblood v. Youngblood, 76 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1934, opinion
adopted) noting that homestead claimants leased an adjacent 99 acre tract to their son-in-
law and then to their son on a share-cropping basis. Some of those crops were actually used
by the claimants in kind. Moreover, the two tracts in Youngblood were largely contiguous
but for an unfenced public road that separated those tracts. Youngblood is an example of a
situation that might very well still support a homestead claim of non-contiguous tracts,
even when some rental income is being generated. In Webb, however, the separate tracts
appeared to be no more or less than rent houses that were not used in connection with the
family's rural home.
34. 267 B.R. 759 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001).
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prior abandonment to a family owned corporation,35 and whether the ad-
jacent 59 acre tract also qualified as a rural homestead.
The court began the inquiry with the basic proposition that the initial
burden of proof in establishing a homestead is on the claimant. 36 Gener-
ally, once that burden has been met, the burden then shifts to the party
seeking to disturb the homestead claim.37 Essentially, there is a presump-
tion that the homestead continues until it is terminated or abandoned,
and again, the burden proving termination or abandonment is on the
party making that claim.38
After disposing of the issue regarding earlier abandonment, 39 the first
inquiry faced by the court was whether the homestead was rural or urban.
The court addressed the interplay between the traditional test developed
in the common law and a relatively new statutory scheme found in the
Property Code.40 The court concluded that it must first address the statu-
tory factor to determine whether the property qualifies as "urban." If it
does not, then the property is rural in nature, and that ends the inquiry.
On the other hand, if the property initially qualifies as "urban" under the
statute, then the court would return to the more traditional test.41
Regarding the two-pronged statutory test, Judge Clark says it best:
The first element asks whether the property is located within the lim-
its of a municipality or its extraterritorial jurisdiction or a platted
subdivision. The second element asks two questions: (1) whether the
property is served by municipal police protection, paid or volunteer
fire protection; and (2) whether a municipality provides the property
with three of the following services: (i) electric, (ii) natural gas, (iii)
sewer, (iv) storm sewer, and (v) water. § 41.002(c)(2). If the property
fails under either the (c)(1) test or one of the two inquiries under
(c)(2), the property will be deemed rural and the court's analysis will
be at an end. If it does not fail either test, only then must the court
proceed to the "traditional" test.42
35. Id. at 761-62. The facts are somewhat more complex. In particular, the 26 acre
tract had previously been conveyed to a family owned corporation, which had previously
obtained a loan secured by that tract, purportedly as what was then non-homestead prop-
erty. Later, that corporation went out of business, and the debtors re-claimed that property
as their homestead.
36. Id. at 764 (citing In re Moody, 77 B.R. 580, 592 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987)); Pace v.
McEwen, 617 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
37. Perry, 267 B.R. at 764.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 761-62.
40. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (Vernon 2000).
41. The so-called traditional test includes factors such as the "location of the land in
relation to limits of a municipality; the situs of the lot in question; the existence of munici-
pal utilities and services; the use of the lot and adjacent property; and the presence of
platted streets, blocks," etc. Perry, 267 B.R. at 766 (citing In re Crowell, 138 F.3d 1031, 1034
(5th Cir. 1998)); see also U.S. v. Blakeman, 997 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1992) (statutory
test not the exclusive test). The Perry court notes a continuing reluctance to rely upon the
statutory test as the exclusive test. See In re Bradley, 960 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
den'd subnom, Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 507 U.S. 971 (1993).
42. Perry, 267 B.R. at 767 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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In Perry, the property was not located within a city limits or extra terri-
torial jurisdiction or a platted subdivision. Therefore, the property was
not considered urban under the statute, and there was no need to resort
to the traditional test. Therefore, the 59 acre tract was held to constitute a
rural homestead.
The 26 acre tract presented a different problem, however, because of
the conduct of a business on that tract. The court cited substantial author-
ity for what has become a well-established principle-"a rural homestead
cannot 'encompass a business homestead' and indeed, the operation of a
business on part of a rural homestead forfeits the homestead protection
on that part of the property.' '43 Because the 26 acre tract was used as a
mobile home park, which also included some year-round tenants, it con-
stituted the operation of a business. 44
The Perry opinion also provides some perspective on the impact of
renting a portion of the rural homestead. Specifically, the court points out
that mere renting of the property, absent some other facts, does not in
and of itself constitute "operation of a business" on the rural
homestead.45
6. Personal Property Exemptions-Wild Card Exemption Trumps
Garnishment
On the subject of personal property exemptions, In re Benson46 pro-
vides an example of the interplay between the post-judgment remedy of
garnishment and the availability of personal property exemptions under
the Bankruptcy Code. In Benson, the holder of a judgment served a writ
of garnishment on the judgment debtor's bank, which trapped just over
$8,000.00. Before the bank's answer date, the debtor filed for Chapter 7
relief. The debtor claimed that amount of money as exempt under the so-
called wild card portion of the Bankruptcy Code exemptions. 47 After a
43. Id. at 768 (emphasis added by Perry court) (citing In re Bradley, 960 F.2d at 506,
n.6).
44. Perry, 267 B.R. at 759, 769.
45. Id. (citing Orr v. Orr, 226 S.W.2d 172, 176 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1948, no
writ)). According to Perry, the Orr court would address the following factors in determin-
ing whether the renting of property constituted a business:
(1) Whether the owner had other income or means of living and had other
businesses or professions;
(2) Whether the owner spent all of his or her time, together with the hired
help, in operating the rented property;
(3) Whether the owner used all of the land and improvements thereon for
the renting of the property;
(4) Whether the owner used all of the proceeds from the renting of the prop-
erty over and above his or her living expenses and the necessary operating
expenses to pay taxes, repair and further the premises.
Perry, 267 B.R. at 769 (citing Orr, 226 S.W.2d at 176).
46. 262 B.R. 371 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2001).
47. Id. at 374. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) (2001). This section allows a debtor claiming
under the Bankruptcy Code (as opposed to state exemptions) to exempt up to a certain
amount of any unused portion of other enumerated exemptions. In this case, this allowed
the debtor to claim money in a demand deposit account as exempt. This is not available
under the Texas statute. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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thorough analysis of the development of garnishment under Texas law,48
the court determined that the garnishment was stayed by the bankruptcy
filing,49 which deprived the state court of the ability to enforce the gar-
nishment by what would have been an execution on the garnishment. Ad-
ditionally, the court found that the garnishment was effectively a judicial
lien, fixed against an interest of the debtor, which impaired an exemption
to which the debtor would have otherwise been entitled.50 Because the
garnishment was a judicial lien, the lien was subject to avoidance under
Section 522(f)(1)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.5 1 Accordingly, because of
the exemption claim and the court's analysis that the garnishment consti-
tuted a judicial lien, the garnishment was avoided. 52
B. DISCHARGEABILITY
1. Vicarious Liability For Partner's Actions
In In re M.M. Winkler & Associates,53 the Fifth Circuit found that
under Mississippi state partnership law, a partner was vicariously liable
'for a fraud carried out by another partner in the course of the partnership
business. One of the partners who was apparently innocent of any direct
wrongdoing sought relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code; how-
ever, the lPifth Circuit found that under the concept of vicarious general
partnership liability, the debt was also non-dischargeable as to that part-
ner, regardless of whether that partner actually received any benefit from
the fraud.54
Although this case dealt with a Mississippi partnership and Mississippi
partnership law, it is important because of the court's "plain meaning"
approach to the concept of vicarious liability under principles of general
partnership law. The court relied on two Supreme Court opinions to sup-
port its holding, and under Texas law, general partnerships also give rise
to vicarious (civil) liability for general partners. 55 There may be a conflict
among the Circuits arising out of this opinion, however, so it is impossible
48. In general, garnishment is governed by Chapter 63 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code and Rules 657, et seq. of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
49. Benson, 262 B.R. at 377-78 (citing Baytown State Bank v. Nimmons, 904 S.W.2d
902 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ)).
50. Id. at 378-79 (citing In re Henderson, 18 F.3d 1305 (5th Cir. 1994)).
51. Section 522(f)(1) allows for avoidance of a judicial lien. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) &
522(f)(1)(A).
52. As a practical matter, a debtor seeking to claim a substantial equity interest in a
Texas homestead would not be able to achieve this result. The Texas exemption statutes
contain no similar counterpart to the "wild card" exemption in the Bankruptcy Code.
Compare TEX. PROP. COE ANN. §§ 41.001, 41.002, 42.001, 42.002 (Vernon Supp. 2002)
with 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).
53. Deodati v. M.M. Winkler & Assoc., 239 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 2001).
54. Id. at 751-52.
55. See Strang v. Bradner, 114 U.S. 555 (1885); Cohen v. De la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213
(1998). See also TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-3.04 (Vernon Supp. 2002) ("[A]II
partners are jointly and severally liable for all debts and obligations of the partnership
unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law"); see generally Smith v.
Waynan, 224 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. 1949); see also Remington v. U.S., 210 F.3d 281 (5th Cir.
2000); but see Darnell v. Martin, 740 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1987, writ den'd)
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to tell whether the Supreme Court would grant certiorari, and, if so, what
the outcome would be. Similarly, predicting an outcome under Texas
state law would be pure speculation; however, even though the result is
quite harsh, it is arguably a plain meaning application of the concept of
pure vicarious liability in a civil context.5 6
2. Credit Card Debt-Implied Representation (Mercer, Cont'd)
In the area of dischargeability of credit card debt, the saga of In re
Mercer57 concluded with an en banc opinion out of the Fifth Circuit. The
en banc decision provided a lengthy and detailed analysis of the use of
credit cards in the context of the ordinary fraud exception to discharge.5 8
In short, the most significant development of this opinion was that the
Fifth Circuit held that each use of the pre-approved credit card by the
debtor constituted an implied representation by the debtor of her intent
to repay any credit extended.5 9 The implied representation occurs "at
card-use, not at card-issuance. '60 Moreover, "there is no statutory basis
for distinguishing between cards obtained at the debtor's initiative and
those obtained in response to a solicitation (pre-approved)." 61
The court also found that the creditor "actually relied" as a matter of
law on the debtor's implied representations. 62 The case was remanded,
however, for a determination regarding the falsity of the debtor's repre-
sentations, the debtor's intent to deceive the creditor, and whether the
creditor's reliance was justifiable. 63 Although, as stated, the opinion was
quite lengthy, overruled some prior precedent, and provided a lengthy
and detailed analysis of the whole issue of credit card dischargeability, it
is difficult to comment much beyond the issues discussed above because
of the fact-intensive nature of what will be faced by the Mercer court on
remand (and other bankruptcy courts in the future). There was also no
bright line rule coming out of the Mercer case other than the fact that we
now know, at least in the Fifth Circuit, that the implied representation
theory applies and, in that context, there is little distinction applicable to
pre-approved credit cards.
(holding that the criminal conviction of one partner did not give rise to contribution claim
against non-culpable partner).
56. But see Darnell, 740 S.W.2d at 15 (holding that the criminal conviction and its
consequences were personal to culpable partner but not chargeable to other partner with-
out knowledge).
57. 246 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2001).
58. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). This section excepts from discharge any debt for an
extension of credit obtained by "false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud,
other than a statement respecting the debtor's ... financial condition."
59. Mercer, 246 F.3d at 404.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 402-03. The court continued, "Accordingly, although this case involves a
pre-approved card, the standard we adopt-common-law fraud-is not so confined." (em-
phasis provided by court). "On the other hand, a card's pre-approval may be relevant as to
whether the initial reliance was justifiable." Id.
62. Id. at 391.
63. Id. at 425.
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3. Collateral Estoppel Following Arbitration
In In re O'Neill,6 4 a bankruptcy court again was faced with the decision
whether to apply the principle of collateral estoppel in dischargeability
litigation. In O'Neill, however, the issues that were to be precluded from
re-litigation arose out of an arbitration rather than a trial. Moreover, the
arbitration award had not been confirmed by a trial court.
In general, collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, applies
in dischargeability litigation.65 The arbitration issue was not entirely a
matter of first impression, however, because as the O'Neill court noted, a
Texas bankruptcy court, applying California law, had previously applied
collateral estoppel effect to an arbitration. 66
Finding that the Texas collateral estoppel issues were satisfied by the
prior arbitration,67 and finding that the case was "fully and fairly liti-
gated" in light of prior Fifth Circuit authority, 68 the court found that the
arbitration award would hold, and the parties were collaterally estopped
from re-litigating the issues already decided in the arbitration.
C. CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE-VALUATION
In the post-Rash world, readers of the Survey will recall the develop-
ment of property valuation in a Chapter 13 context through the saga of In
re Rash,69 which in effect required application of a replacement cost ap-
proach to property that is being retained by a debtor in a reorganization
context, specifically a Chapter 13 plan. In In re Longbine,70 the court
found that a vehicle to be retained by a Chapter 13 debtor should be
retained as of the petition date, as opposed to the date of a confirmation
hearing. 71
64. 260 B.R. 122 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2001).
65. Id. at 126 (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 (1991)); see also In re Davis,
3 F.3d 113, 114 (5th Cir. 1993).
66. See In re Marx, 171 B.R. 218 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994).
67. The issues are whether the facts sought to be litigated in the second action were
fully and fairly litigated in the prior action, whether the facts were essential to the judg-
ment in the first action, and whether the parties were cast as actual adversaries. O'Neill,
260 B.R. at 126-27.
68. See In re Pancake, 106 F.3d 1242 (5th Cir. 1997).
69. 520 U.S. 953 (1997). This case came out of the Fifth Circuit, which had previously
withdrawn an earlier opinion and substituted it with an en banc opinion. See In re Rash, 31
F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 1994), modified on denial of rehearing, 62 F.3d 685 (1995), modified on
rehearing en banc, 90 F.3d 1036 (1996), cert granted, 117 S. Ct. 758 (1997). The en banc
opinion was analyzed, and to some extent criticized, in an earlier edition of the Survey. See
Roger S. Cox, Bankruptcy and Creditors' Rights, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 50 SMU L.
REV. 989, 993 (1997). That analysis included a substantial review of the dissent to the en
banc opinion. That dissent (and this author's analysis) turned out to be much more consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's ultimate ruling than what was found in the en banc opinion.
70. 256 B.R. 470 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2000).
71. Theoretically, the vehicle could have been filed as of the date of filing the case, the
effective date of the plan, and the actual date of confirmation. The court adopted another
bankruptcy court's analysis in In re Kennedy, 177 B.R. 967 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1995); how-
ever, the court disagreed with that court's conclusion. In effect, because it was the debtor's
use of the property, which continued from the date of confirmation, it made the most sense
to value that collateral as of the date of the filing of the case.
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IV. OTHER CREDITORS' RIGHTS CASES
A. NOTE PURCHASERS AND ASSIGNEES-LIMITATIONS
1. Promissory Notes
In Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf,72 the Texas Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether the federal six year statute of limi-
tations applied for the benefit of a note purchaser when the note had not
yet matured at the time of a bank's receivership. The opinion also clari-
fied when a note is accelerated and, therefore, when a cause of action on
a note accrues.
In Wolf, the borrower was in default under a note; however, the FDIC
did not accelerate the note. The FDIC then sold the note, and the new
holder of the note sent the borrower a notice of default and intent to
accelerate. Two notices of acceleration followed, both of which indicated
dates for a possible non-judicial foreclosure sale. The foreclosure never
actually occurred, the church did not resume making payments, and the
note was sold to a third party. The new holder ultimately conducted a
trustee's sale, but the borrower sued for a declaratory judgment claiming
the foreclosure was void because of limitations. 73
The note holder agreed that limitations began to run as of the date of
the first notice of acceleration; however, as an assignee of the FDIC, the
holder argued that the six year statute of limitations applied.
The court of appeals did not reach the limitations issue; rather, it found
a fact issue regarding when the cause of action on the note accrued. The
supreme court dispensed with that issue by simply reiterating the require-
ment that acceleration of a note requires two acts: (1) notice of intent to
accelerate and (2) notice of acceleration.74 Notably, the court of appeals,
relying on an earlier opinion from the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals,
indicated that acceleration cannot be fully exercised without actually tak-
ing steps toward foreclosure. 75 The Texas Supreme Court acknowledged
that some authority to that effect existed; however, those cases were ex-
pressly disapproved of by the Court, and it made clear that acceleration
requires only a clear and unequivocal notice. 76
With the acceleration issue resolved, the court then turned to limita-
tions. In short, the court, following Cadle Co. v. 1007 Joint Venture,
77
found that the federal six year statute applies only when the note has
already matured as of the time of a bank receivership. In a case where the
72. 44 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2001).
73. Id. at 565.
74. Id. at 566 (citing Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex.
1991)).
75. Id. at 569 (citing Swaboda v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 975 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1998, pet. den'd)).
76. Id. at 570. To hold, as the court of appeals did here, that acceleration does not
occur and thus an action does not accrue until a foreclosure posting or sale takes place
would, in essence, mean the foreclosure posting or sale would be the triggering event
bringing about the right to hold a foreclosure sale. This result is nonsensical.
77. 82 F.3d 102, 105 (5th Cir. 1996).
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note is current, or it has not otherwise matured or been accelerated, the
state law statute will apparently apply to the assignee. 78
The court recognized its earlier holding in Jackson v. Thweatt,79 in
which it held that the FDIC's six year statute of limitations applied to an
assignee. The court also recognized substantial other authority to this ef-
fect,8n and reiterated the principle that an assignee generally stands in the
shoes of its assignor. The court appeared, however, to contradict itself for
what can only be described as policy reasons consistent with those earlier
stated by the Fifth Circuit in the Cadle Co. case.8 '
2. Effect of Judgment on Limitations Against Lien Debt
In National Asset Placement Corp. v. Western Securities,82 the assignee
reached a similar fate, although for different reasons. In this case, the
FDIC was the holder of a note secured by a deed of trust lien. The note
matured January 1, 1989, which means the six year statute would have
expired January 1, 1995.83 The note, however, was reduced to judgment
on January 3, 1994. The FDIC's assignee argued, therefore, that it had at
least six years following the date of the judgment, rather than six years
following the original maturity of the note, within which to initiate a fore-
closure of the underlying deed of trust lien.
Consistent with earlier authority, the Court of Appeals concluded that
the "acknowledgment of debt" provision of the general federal statute of
limitations applied to a FIRREA based claim, which then left the court to
determine whether the agreed judgment on the note would constitute a
written acknowledgment, thereby extending limitations. The court held
that upon the entry of the judgment, the FDIC's cause of action no longer
existed, therefore, it was impossible for limitations to accrue again. Thus,
the purchaser was left with the remedy of collecting on that judgment.
Continuing along that same line, the court found that because the fore-
closure right was not itself a cause of action, the concept of an acknowl-
edgment of debt did not apply to that remedy.8 4
The opinion was not clear with respect to what recitations, if any, were
contained within the judgment. In this situation, a practitioner may wish
78. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d at 573-74.
79. 883 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1994).
80. See e.g., FDIC v. Bledsoe, 989 F.2d 805, 810 (5th Cir. 1993); Cadle Co. II v. Lewis,
864 P.2d 718, 724 (Kan. 1993).
81. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d at 572. In following the Fifth Circuit, the court explained:
The court recognized the policies behind extending the six-year period to
transferees, but noted that this "reasoning loses force with a note performing
when the FDIC transfers it; because such a note is not in default, it has value
to a prospective transferee and no limitation period is running."
Id. (citing Cadle Co., 82 F.3d at 105-06). See also Beckley Capital Ltd. v. DiGeronimo, 184
F.3d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 1999).
82. 49 S.W.3d 420 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, no writ).
83. This case apparently came down before Beckley, so it is not clear whether the six
year statute or the four year statute would have applied in light of that case. That issue was
not determinative, however, in the Western Securities case.
84. Western Sec., 49 S.W.3d at 424-25.
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to include language in an agreed judgment to the effect that the underly-
ing deed of trust lien is renewed for a set period of time, and better yet,
obtain a written renewal and extension agreement that complies with the
real property limitations statute found in the Civil Practice and Remedies
Code. 85 Reading the opinion in Western Securities literally, this may not
suffice, but this would appear to be a more practical solution to what the
case turned into a potentially impossible situation.
85. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 16.036 (Vernon Supp. 2002). This statute requires
extension of a real estate lien debt to be in writing, signed by the debtor, and recorded in
the county in which the real property is located.
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